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Abstract  
 The growing call for the reinvention of true federalism in many 
federations reflects the ambiguity inherent in federalism and its practice 
across countries. This article arises from the controversy it has generated, as 
to whether there is anything like true federalism or not, where it can be 
found, and how to determine it. Beyond lending a voice to the debate, this 
article contributes significantly by simplifying in clear terms, why there 
exists such calls for true federalism, what depicts it, and what specific factors 
should be looked out for in order to ascertain the practice of true federalism. 
By employing the schematics of the Venn diagram, the article creates the 
templates to visually perceive the interactions between political entities in a 
federal relation; showing the opposing forces—unification and autonomy—
in each entity, which true federalism aims to accommodate, nurture, and 
safeguard. It concludes that true federalism is the pursuit for unification and 
maintenance of some levels of independence among different political 
communities in a given federation, without the attempt by any government to 
suppress each of these expressions. 
 
Keywords: True federalism, Meaning, Definitions, Illustrations, Venn 
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Introduction 
 The polemics over the definition of federalism poses grave confusion, 
especially to emerging federations that are still aiming to evolve a workable 
federal governance for their societies. While many scholars find consolation 
in concluding that there are varieties of federalism, which means the goal to 
find unifying features of federalism is illusory, others continue to call for the 
reinvention of ‘true federalism’ as the only way to solve given political 
problems. This article is an exploratory research conducted through 
qualitative means to confront two main questions: a) what depicts ‘true 
federalism’? And b) how can it be ascertained?  
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 To address these questions, this paper analyses relevant literature 
from renowned scholars on the subject and attempts to identify the common 
grounds in the main definitions of federalism, especially in the Anglo-Saxon 
literature. The reason for this is that the American model provides, to a large 
extent, the standard on which most formal federal states are modelled. 
Employing the schematics of the Venn diagram provides the means to 
visually illustrate the interactions between political entities in a federal 
relation; making it obvious how two opposing forces—unification and 
autonomy—in each entity influence their engagement in a federal bargain. 
Consequently, the article argues that it is in the maintenance of ‘equilibrium 
or balance’ between these forces that true federalism finds its meaning. It 
illustrates how strengthening or undermining equilibrium, or balance, 
impacts on the structure of a federation, and its implications on the goal of 
federalism, or the quest for ‘true federalism’.  
 The remainder of this article is divided into five sections. The first 
reviews the literature on the search for true federalism. The second analyses 
key definitions, and their criticisms, from the Anglo-American literature on 
federalism to stipulate commonalities between them, in order to help 
establish what true federalism is. In the third section, the criticality of 
equilibrium in relation to true federalism is discussed, and how to measure 
equilibrium is provided. The fourth section introduces the Venn diagram, to 
establish its relevance to the federalist discussion. Thereafter, several 
illustrations are given with Venn diagrams to differentiate the ‘supposed’ 
varieties of federalism, in order to distinguish the ‘true’ federalism. The last 
section presents the answers to the main questions of this study in conclusive 
terms. 
 
The search for True federalism 
 There is no doubt that federalism has some ambiguities that have 
weakened the possibility for a clear cut definition, which makes it less 
satisfactory for those of whom such definition is of the essence, according to 
(Elazar, 1987, p. 15). In spite of this, Elazar remained optimistic that careful 
attention can sort them out, so that in any instance, rigorous usage of the 
term can be maintained (Elazar, 1987, p. 29). However, about three decades 
have gone by, yet the ambiguities remain, as the ongoing quest for true 
federalism suggests. The problem is rooted in the opposing descriptors which 
scholars associate federalism with, such as unity and diversity, shared and 
self-rule, centralization and decentralization, interdependence and 
independence or autonomy, and general and constituent governments.  
 Interpreting how to combine or accommodate the sets of the 
contrasting values in a specific federal institutional set-up has been so 
difficult that operations, and also expectations, continue to vary across 
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formal federal states. Where the operation is not leading to the expected 
results that occasioned the federal bargain, there are clamours for a re-
examination of the federal system in order to enthrone true, real, genuine, 
proper, or pure federalism. This is exactly true especially in Nigeria—the 
longest surviving federation in Africa. Several nationality groups and notable 
Nigerians, including those that took part in the recent 2014 Confab, are 
calling for ‘true federalism’ as the only solution to the political problems in 
Nigeria. Elaigwu (2002, p. 84) explains that these calls are linked to the post-
military rule situation that has led to the emergence of a very strong central 
government. In fact, it is becoming near impossible for any federalism 
scholar, or even commentators and religious leaders, in Nigeria to conclude 
any given piece of research, or talk, without making a reference to true 
federalism.73 
 The quest for true federalism is equally popular and vociferous in a 
number of other federal countries across all continents. In India, some 
constitutional provisions and practices that reinforce the pre-potency of the 
central government are being questioned, even among youths, as to how they 
represent true federalism (Bhattacharyya, 2002, p. 95; IAS Baba, 2015; 
Mehta, 2014). In Pakistan, the predominance of the Punjabis in the central 
government appears to have denied political space and economic 
opportunities to others who continue to demand for true federalism (Khalid, 
2013, p. 200; Naqvi, 2010). The argument in Mexico is that the centre’s 
omnipotence and interference over the affairs of the states should be replaced 
with true federalism (Heidler & Heidler, 2006, p. 16; Merchant & Rich, 
2003, p. 662; Ponce de León, 1999). The call is equally loud in Russia due to 
the excessive centralization of economic activities and maintenance of a 
superpower military, which no doubt frightens some of the regions that have 
been jostling for secession. It is now contemplated among Russian scholars, 
how likely it is that Russia will attain true federalism in the current 
administration (Heuvel, 2000, p. 23; Petrov & Slider, 2015, p. 81; Ross, 
2000, p. 417; Salikov, 2003, p. 2; Schlesinger, 2013, p. 413).  
 In most of the remaining federations, occasions have arisen where 
scholars have needed to emphasize the term ‘true federalism’ as against a 
mere mention of federalism alone. Wingo (1986, p. 476) lamented that the 
Supreme Court’s unwillingness to employ a particular pretext in a decision, 
was by far the most significant factor for the collapse of true federalism in 
the United States. Papillon (2008, p. 9) argues that the practice of Aboriginal 
governance in Canada has evolved towards a type of multilevel governance 
                                                            
73 The following are just a proportion of available examples: Adamu (2005); Bolarinwa 
(2014); Ejobowah (2009); Elaigwu (2002); Elebeke (2014); Ikein, Alamieyeseigha, and 
Azaiki (2008); Kalu (2015); Odje (2002); Sagay (2014); Senator Olubiyi Durojaiye (2014); 
Suberu (2009); Wayas (1998).  
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that does not entirely reflect true federalism. Dardanelli (2010, p. 154), in a 
reaction to Watts’ proposition about the possibility of federalism in an 
oligarchic system, argues that true federalism cannot function in such a 
system. There has also been a study that focused on true federalism with 
respect to Germany.74 In Belgium, Witte, Craeybeckx, and Meynen (2009, p. 
379), also tried to speculate on the road to a true federalism. 
 With all the references to true federalism from various angles, it 
becomes viable to ask what true federalism actually is. While it is deducible 
from the discussion, of the general expectation of proponents for increased 
powers of the constituent governments as central to true federalism, the 
specific limit to such increase in powers in relation to that of the central 
government remains a matter for conjecture. According to Elaigwu (2002, p. 
84), by ‘true federalism’, the protagonists of a weak central government refer 
to a ‘confederation’ or what they claim to be the classical model of 
federalism delineated by K. C. Wheare. He recalls that the callers insist true 
federalism should express clear demarcation of powers and functions among 
the levels of government which should be autonomous in the exercise of 
those powers and functions assigned by the constitution. In a similar vein, 
Heidler and Heidler (2006, p. 16) equate true federalism with the conferment 
of significant autonomy to subnational governments, who should be 
unencumbered to superintend their own affairs, in order to cope with 
dynamic economic, social, and racial diversity of the country in question.  
 A couple of other views are in contrast to the above. For example, 
Artus (2011, p. 3) opines that within a country or a currency area such as the 
euro zone, ‘true’ federalism consists in the fact that the regions with 
surpluses (in terms of external trade) which are richer, transfer incomes to 
regions with deficits which are poorer. He went further to argue that without 
true federalism it is difficult to conceive of how Greece and Portugal can 
remain in the Euro zone.75 Similarly, Verny (1998) argues that a true 
federalism has both a distribution of political power specified in the 
constitution and a direct relationship between political power and the 
individual citizen. Furthermore, Moots (2009, p. 402) argues forcefully that 
what distinguishes true federalism from the mere use of the federal principle 
is that it is more than just sharing of powers coupled with self-rule for the 
sake of other ends, rather distribution is necessary for its own sake.  
 For Wegierski (2011), what constitutes true federalism is the 
empowerment for the expression of divergent tendencies that would 
otherwise have a centrifugal effect on a given polity. This resonates with 
Benoit Pelletier’s earlier assertion that the true meaning of federalism is the 
                                                            
74 See Artus (2011). 
75 Artus (2011, p. 4). 
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necessary respect for differences and diversity, in which absence he argues 
amounts to rejecting the very basis of federalism Pelletier (2005, p. 3). 
Relatedly, Hodgins and Wright (1978, p. 51), identifies fine balance and 
non-interference between two levels of government as the basis of true 
federalism; the reason being to safeguard the differences earlier mentioned.  
 Meanwhile, there are many other scholars who believe there is 
nothing like ‘true federalism’. Their conviction is that every federal system is 
designed to achieve some specific goals with regard to the peculiar situation 
of each society; therefore whatever achieves this mission becomes a ‘true’ 
federalism for that particular society. For example, Livingston (1956, p. 4) 
argues that federalism admits of infinite variations, and Elazar concurs to this 
with his assertion that there is more than one way in which federalism could 
be applied (Elazar, 1987, p. 6). In the opinion of Franck (1968, p. 169) the 
concept of federalism is malleable enough to bend with the realities. 
Consequently, Ejobowah (2009, p. 513) builds on the above ideas and argues 
that it would be more appropriate to speak of varieties of federal 
arrangements and regard each of the summarized prescriptive arguments as 
relative or context-specific. In this vein, he concludes succinctly that there is 
no such thing as ‘ideal’, ‘perfect’, or ‘true’ federalism.  
 Conceding to the validity of a variety of federal arrangements as 
suggested above does not help matters but has been the key contributing 
factor to the increasing call for true federalism. It will amount to a stark 
insensitivity to ignore the need to identify a unifying nature of federalism. 
There is a definite expectation that most people have in mind when they 
make reference to true federalism. Alternatively, it could be argued that since 
federalism has been alleged to exist in different shades, maybe one of the 
shades could possibly present the system that proponents stress as ‘true’ 
federalism. Unfortunately, even among the proponents for true federalism, 
there seems to be contradictions relating to what constitutes true federalism. 
Three distinct ideas summarize their positions as follows: 
a) Weak central government against stronger constituent governments – 
confederation;  
b) Strict adherence to the division of powers between levels of 
government to safeguard the autonomy of constituent governments – 
classical model of federalism; and  
c) The necessity of sharing and distribution of benefits across the polity 
such that wealth can be redistributed from richer regions to poorer regions – 
cooperative model of federalism.  
 Therefore, an effort is made below to assess the question of true 
federalism and to find out what depicts it by analysing the key definitions 
that have shaped the various positions and expectations as pointed out above.  
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Establishing True federalism 
 It should be recalled that K.C Wheare made the first bold attempt to 
formulate a clear conception of federalism, following his analysis of the 
American constitution which established the premier modern federal system. 
He began with an initial observation that “most of those who use it agree on 
this, that they have in mind an association of states, which has been formed 
for certain common purposes, but in which the member states retain a large 
measure of their original independence” (Wheare, 1963, p. 1). 
Acknowledging the possibility of relating this notion of federalism to several 
political associations, and the ambiguity it generates, Wheare set out to 
uncover what is distinctive of the system established in the US Constitution. 
He observed that in earlier associations of states, including the US under the 
Articles of Confederation, the organization was such that the general 
government was dependent upon the regional governments or vice versa; 
whereas in the US Constitution, he found none was dependent on the other as 
each level has areas of independent jurisdictions.76 This distinction 
distinguishes confederation, which presents constituent units’ superiority, 
and a unitary system, in which the general government is superior. 
Federalism is seen as the centre of the two extreme systems, in which case, 
each is independent and limited, and none dominates the other. 
 However, a growing overlap and mutual interdependence has been 
observed between the levels of government of federal systems, which makes 
the premise of independence, either overemphasized or simply unfeasible as 
critics argue.77 The critics, therefore, dismiss Wheare’s definition as being 
unduly legalistic and utopian. Meanwhile, the alternative definitions offered 
have also received criticisms which demonstrate the nature of the polemics. 
To start with, Livingston (1956) argued that it was rather an over-emphasis 
to stress the institutional structure of power division as the basis of Wheare’s 
definition: “The essential nature of federalism is to be sought for, not in the 
shadings of legal and constitutional terminology, but in … the forces that can 
be called ‘the federal quality of the society’ which comprises ‘diversities 
grouped territorially’ within a society” (Livingston, 1956, pp. 1-3).  
 The analyses and criticisms of Wheare and Livingston’s formulations 
form the basis of subsequent scholarly attempts at extrapolating federalism. 
For this reason, I limit my review on those propositions that are distinct from 
those made by the above two scholars, and also, focus of which direct us to a 
                                                            
76 An association of states, so organized that powers are divided between a general 
government which in certain matters—for example, the making of treaties and coining of 
money—is independent of the governments of the associated states, and, on the other hand, 
state governments which in certain matters are, in turn, independent of the general 
government” (Wheare, 1963, pp. 7, 2). 
77  See Elazar (1969, pp. 379-410); Grodzins (1966, pp. 84-85).  
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different aspect of federalism to consider. William Riker reinforces Wheare 
by stressing the division of powers between levels of government. However, 
he went further to add that the allure for military security and economic 
expansion are paramount for the formation of a federation through what he 
called the ‘federal bargain’, between prospective national leaders and 
officials of constituent governments (Riker, 1964, pp. 11-12). As a result, he 
believes that the design of the federal system would be different across 
various societies depending on what is important for the federal bargain. 
Hence, in some cases, a level of government might just have a single area of 
autonomous action, against another level that might have many. According 
to Riker, if the central government has more areas of autonomous actions, 
then it is a ‘centralized federalism’ and if the constituent governments have 
more, then it is ‘peripheralized federalism’.78  
 Carl Friedrich (1968) adds another important dimension of thought, 
which seems to illuminate Livingston’s sociological view of federalism. At 
the root of his discussion of federalism is the prominence of communities or 
separate political entities. He began by observing that “federal order 
typically preserves the institutional and behavioural features of a ‘foedus’—a 
compact or treaty between equals to act jointly on specific issues of general 
policy” (Friedrich, 1968, p. 6). He stresses further: “we have federalism only 
if a set of political communities coexist and interact as autonomous entities, 
united in a common order with an autonomy of its own” (Friedrich, 1968, p. 
8). As such, he concludes that federalism is also, and perhaps primarily, the 
process of federalizing a political community; that is to say, the process by 
which a number of separate political communities enter into arrangements 
for working out solutions (Friedrich, 1968, p. 7). 
 Another perspective emerges in Elazar and Watts’ writings. They 
both recognize the social factors and diversities that shape federalism, and as 
well, they note the importance of formal structures which regulate the forces 
from the diverse territorial groups. Elazar is the chief exponent of the 
‘covenant’ basis of federalism,79 which has become very attractive as it 
simplifies the subject. According to him, “a covenant is a morally-informed 
agreement or pact between people or parties having an independent and 
sufficiently equal status, based upon voluntary consent, and established by 
mutual oaths or promises witnessed by the relevant higher authority” (Elazar, 
1980, p. 6). Against this backdrop, Elazar asserts that a federal arrangement, 
in essence, is “one of partnership, established and regulated by a covenant, 
whose internal relationships reflect the special kind of sharing that must 
                                                            
78 Riker (1964, pp. 5-7).    
79 This is evident in most of his works on federalism including the following: Elazar (1980, 
pp. 6-9; 1987, p. 5; 1991, p. 232; 1993, p. 194; 1994, pp. 111-129). 
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prevail among partners, based on a mutual recognition of the integrity of 
each partner and the attempt to a special unity among them” (Elazar, 1987, p. 
5). He summarized by presenting the simplest possible definition of 
federalism, as ‘self-rule plus shared rule’.80 
 Watts develops further the idea of self-rule and shared rule as central 
to federalism, for which he believes the former is necessary to safeguard the 
prior organic ties the diverse groups have had before coming to form a joint 
government-shared rule. Examining several federations, he however found 
that, what was distinctive about the social situations which produced 
federalism was not merely the duality of demands for union and regional 
autonomy, but the relative balance or equilibrium in each community 
between the conflicting forces for unity and diversity” (Watts, 1966, p. 93). 
Hence, he adds the notion of ‘balance’ or ‘equilibrium’ into the debates of 
federalism as its key distinguishing feature. This marks a point of theoretical 
saturation regarding the definition of federalism in the literature. It is 
therefore rare to see any subsequent definition of federalism that departs 
significantly from the conceptualizations explored above. The table below 
provides the summary of these key formulations in order to ease the task of 
extrapolating the central feature that signals what ‘true’ federalism is.  
Table 1 Major definitions and extraction of key elements of federalism 
 
Main scholastic views of federalism 
 
Key Elements or Emphases 
 
Federalism as Institutional Structure-Dual Federalism 
Most of those who use the term [federalism] agree that 
they have in mind an association of states, which has 
been formed for certain common purposes. The federal 
principle is the method of dividing powers so that the 
general and regional governments are each within a 
sphere co-ordinate and independent of one another.—
Wheare (1963, pp. 1, 10) 
 
Division of powers; associated states; 
forming joint government; general and 
regional government; independence; 
coordinate, non-subordination. 
 
Federalism as the Quality of the Society 
Federalism is a device to protect the federal quality of a 
society, which comprises ‘diversities’ grouped 
territorially. …uniting into a single polity a number of 
component polities so that the personality and 
individuality of each are largely preserved, while 
creating in the new totality a separate and distinct 
political and constitutional unit. —Livingston (1956, 
pp. 2, 9) 
 
Diversity; territorial separate groups; 
interactions; joint government; tensions 
between groups to undermine the other; 
need to protect and preserve diversities. 
 
Federalism as a Bargain 
Federalism is a bargain between prospective national 
leaders and officials of constituent governments for the 
purpose of aggregating territory. This bargain can be 
identified with the following rules: two levels of 
 
Joint establishment of a central 
government through bargain by constituent 
political entities; division of powers with 
jurisdictional overlap––two governments 
rule same land—and independence. 
                                                            
80 See particularly Elazar (1987, p. 12). 
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government rule the same land and people; each level 
has areas of action in which it is autonomous; and there 
is some guarantee of the autonomy of each government 
in its own sphere. –– Riker (1964, p. 12) 
Guaranteed autonomy of each government. 
 
Federalism as a Process 
Federalism is the process of federalizing a political 
community…by which a number of separate political 
communities enter into arrangements for working out 
solutions, and making joint decisions on joint problems. 
We have federalism only if a set of political 
communities coexist and interact as autonomous 
entities, united in a common order with an autonomy of 
its own.—Friedrich (1968, pp. 7-8) 
 
Separate political communities; process; 
interaction; a formed arrangement for 
common purpose; division of powers to 
grant autonomy to each level of 
government; ongoing tensions that need to 
be institutionally checked. 
 
Federalism as Sharing (i.e.; self-rule plus shared rule) 
Federal principles are concerned with the combination 
of self-rule and shared rule. They grow out of the idea 
that free people can freely enter into lasting, yet limited, 
political association to achieve common ends and 
protect certain rights while preserving their respective 
integrities.––Elazar (1987, pp. 5, 33). 
 
Political partners; joint establishment; 
independent and joint spheres; 
relationship; mutual respect; plausibility of 
tension; protection of differences across 
political communities. 
 
Federalism as Balance/Equilibrium of opposing 
demands 
Federalism is about the relative balance or equilibrium 
in the conflicting demands for union and regional 
autonomy within different federating communities. The 
essence of federalism is the value of perpetuating both 
union and diversity at the same time. 
––Watts (1966, p. 93); (2008, p. 8). 
 
Separate regions; joint government; self-
government; identified balance in 
opposing demands as key; preserving the 
balance; relationships or interactions; non-
subordination; equality. 
  
 From the table, Watts’ advancement of the notion of equilibrium 
captures the central message that can be deduced in the others, and provides 
the clue to pin-point what federalism precisely is; or ‘true federalism’ that is 
devoid of prefixes and other adjectival qualifications. At the foundation of 
each definitional conception is the idea of ‘political entities’ wishing to come 
together, in anticipation of certain benefit(s) that can only result if they unite. 
These entities, also have their separate values which they can only protect if 
they stayed independent or autonomous of the other political entity. How to 
design a system that would incorporate and or resolve this dilemma becomes 
the challenge of federalism.81 Hence, in most of the arguments, proponents 
have always presented different poles of possibilities for federalism such as 
peripherialized and centralized options, among other varieties of federalism. 
For example, Livingston asserts that federalism is thus, not an absolute but a 
relative term; for there is no identifiable point at which a society ceases to be 
unified and become wholly diversified (Livingston, 1956, p. 4). A similar 
                                                            
81 This is true for all formal federal systems and quasi-federal organizations; even those that 
are currently being debated like the European Union.  
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assertion is made by Elazar, and also Watts, who opines that federalism can 
be considered a broad genus of political organizations of which there are 
different species (Elazar, 1987, p. 6; Watts, 2008, pp. 8-9). 
 The difference in categories depends on the status, outcome, or result 
of the tension between two opposing demands – the desire for union against 
independence (Wheare, 1963, p. 37), fostering integration or unification 
against diversity (Livingston, 1956, p. 4), preserving shared rule against self-
rule (Elazar, 1987, p. 5), and the goal of maintaining maximum and or 
minimum powers by each of the levels of government (Riker, 1964, p. 6). 
That is to say, the prominence of each of the opposing demands in the 
scheme of things distinguishes the federal institutional forms. For example, if 
the desire for independence trumps that for union, the result is a 
confederation; whereas the prominence of the desire for union above 
independence results in a unitary system. But a federation represents the 
system in which both demands are relatively prominent and almost, if not, in 
equilibrium.   
 The importance of balance or equilibrium is implicitly recognized by 
each of these scholars in their arguments. For instance, Livingston concludes 
that federal system is an institutionalization of the compromise between two 
opposing demands, and that the federal constitution structures the limits of 
this compromise (Livingston, 1956, p. 6). More forcefully, the constitution 
will be more or less federal in accordance with the relative strength of the 
two demands (ibid). Similarly, Wheare’s emphasis on the independent 
jurisdiction of each level of government is premised on the need to ensure 
that none dominates the other, which is an allusion to the target of 
equilibrium and balance.  
 Furthermore, Riker, in distinguishing federalism between where a 
level of government possesses maximum powers to make unilateral 
decisions in all but one and vice versa, observes that few federalisms 
relatively lie at either extremes (Riker, 1964, p. 6). In other words, 
federalism mostly lies at the middle, where no level can unilaterally make a 
decision affecting the entire union, which accentuates balance. For Elazar’s 
self-rule and shared rule combination, he points out that each of these factors 
has to be limited in such a way to provide for the energetic pursuit of 
common ends while maintaining the respective integrities of all parties, 
without replacing or diminishing prior organic ties (Elazar, 1987, pp. 6, 12). 
 It can therefore be argued that if equilibrium is not aimed at and 
balance not maintained, one of the demands under tension would 
overshadow the other, or suppress it, whereas it has been shown that it is 
necessary to maintain a balance between both. How can equilibrium be 
achieved if there are no instruments to safeguard each of the values? It has to 
be noted that federalism is neither a pragmatic nor heuristic exercise. Instead, 
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federalism is principled, focused, and reflects a conscious design and 
commitment to safe-guarding these two opposing demands—an idea that 
Wheare had posited as the federal principle. There is a strong reason, 
therefore, to aver that true federalism is concerned with the goal and means 
of achieving and maintaining equilibrium between the forces that make 
political entities want to be united and the forces that make them want to 
remain separate, autonomous, or independent.  
 
The question of equilibrium 
 Having established the criticality of equilibrium or balance to 
distinguish federalism, the challenge is on how to determine it, or where to 
focus attention in order to assess equilibrium. Wheare, and the proponents of 
institutional approach to the study of federalism, emphasizes the division of 
powers between two levels of government as the foundation of federalism. If 
one links the pursuit of equilibrium or balance to this task, he or she 
confronts the challenge of determining the weight of powers assigned to each 
level of government in order to ascertain whether there is equilibrium or not. 
Most scholars have viewed areas of function that fall under the independent 
jurisdiction of a level of government as an indication of what powers the 
particular government wields. Functions such as defence, currency, and 
commerce are examples of areas of function mostly placed under the central 
government’s independent jurisdiction, while social services, agriculture, and 
education are examples of those placed under the subnational government’s 
independent jurisdiction. 
 Focussing on functions does not help to find equilibrium. Riker’s 
observation is instructive: “there is hardly any mechanical means of totting 
up numbers and the importance of areas of action in which either 
government is independent of the other” (Riker, 1964, p. 7). Similarly, the 
term ‘power’ (as in the division of powers of government) is too abstract, 
and obfuscates the possibility of finding balance. No wonder Riker argues 
that it is better to look beyond the division of boundaries and instead to 
survey the whole range of action in a systematic way, using ‘scholarly 
common sense’ (Riker, 1964, p. 52). This suggestion is interesting but does 
not really offer a specific guide to direct scholars towards determining 
equilibrium. Unfortunately this is the missing link that has made federalism 
remain ambiguous, and the search for true federalism an elusive goal.  
 In order to ease this difficulty, I argue that focus should not be 
entirely on areas of function or powers of government but instead on the 
interactions of the forces that shape the design of that particular structure of 
government—the centrifugal and centripetal forces. This is so because power 
is a means to an end; the end of federalism is the safeguard of these opposing 
demands. It must be remembered at all times that the demands mentioned 
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relate to the needs of political entities which come together because they 
value expansion as well as preservation. Hence, the equilibrium talked of 
should be looked for in the empowerment of each level of government to 
freely express the mandate that reinforces their establishment or being, i.e., 
the pursuit for unification and the goal of maintaining some levels of 
independence, without the attempt by any level of government to suppress 
each of these expressions.  
 The empowerment for these forces can be ascertained in the language 
of the constitution, for which every federal constitution reserves certain 
spheres of activities for the independent action of a particular level of 
government; this is a primary prerequisite.82 However, because of the 
possibility that some operators of the constitution may dump or misapply 
constitutional provisions, the practice of the constitution must equally be 
seen to tolerate and enhance the expression of the opposing demands as 
prescribed in the law of the constitution, to represent true federalism. 
Because these forces are in tension, there is a possibility of each tending to 
overshadow the other and also the possibility of the other resisting the pull. 
Therefore, terms like ‘agitation’ and ‘resistance’, both of which lead to 
compromise, are key indicators to signal the status of equilibrium. The pulls 
and restraints of these forces in the federal intercourse to maintain balance, 
finds perfect illustration with the Venn diagram as demonstrated in the next 
section. 
 
Employing the schematics of the Venn diagram 
 The Venn diagram involves the use of overlapping circles to 
represent propositions and ideas in a logical way to simplify and enhance 
understanding. Each basic Venn diagram is made up of at least two 
overlapping circles to represent groups (called sets) that relate to each other 
which are being studied. The idea of the diagram is, first, that different 
contents in each set or group can be sorted or separated, and represented by 
regions, numbers, or areas in each circle. Secondly, the circles are made to 
overlap in order to merge similar contents from different circles under 
common intersecting region(s), formed by the coming together of the two 
groups of circles, while leaving their separate contents in distinct regions 
outside this intersection. The goal is to provide a visual illustration of all 
possible logical relations between the groups indicated in the same diagram.  
 In relation to federalism and the problem of our study—determining 
equilibrium—sets are political entities. To make it less complex in order to 
                                                            
82 This suggests that whoever is looking for federalism or true federalism should begin by 
observing the constitution of the state or union in question, before other steps could be 
added to confirm the practice of true federalism there.  
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be easily understood, two political entities, which is the minimum 
requirement for a federal bargain to take place, will be used all through the 
illustrations here.83 Political entity A is represented primarily by a yellow 
circle and political entity B is represented by a blue one. Each entity has got 
the two opposing demands contained in them; one, pulling it back to 
preserve her values (independence), and the other pushing it to extend by 
joining another entity to enhance perceived economic gains or strengthened 
security. The former refers to centrifugal forces and it leads to the retention 
of a regional government, while the latter refers to the centripetal force and 
leads to the establishment of a central government for the two entities.  
 Therefore, I start by presenting two circles to represent two political 
entities A and B (see figure 1). In each circle, I separate the two opposing 
demands into different marked equal areas on the circle to show the 
equilibrium of both as seen in Figure 2. In addition, I have indicated the 
areas of similar contents – centripetal demands84 – in the two circles that 
would be merged in setting up the federal government. Finally, I merged the 
two circles and the political entities become regions to illustrate the 
formation of a federal state. 
Figure 1. Two Political Entities - A and B 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
83 While it is true that most federations have much more than two federating units, the main 
point here is to show that in all of them, two opposing demands – unification and 
independence – influence their establishment and subsequent decisions in the union. Hence, 
the mental picture from the illustrations with two units can be extended and reapplied in all 
federations regardless of the number of federating units. The key message is to understand 
that the centre is formed by merging the centripetal forces of each federating unit and 
leaving out their centrifugal demands to be furthered by their independent sub-national 
governments.   
84 These centripetal forces vary by context depending on the contributing factors that led to 
the particular federal bargain – military and security threat, and economic expansion among 
others. 
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Figure 2. Opposing demands in each Political Entity 
Political Entity A                                                            Political Entity B 
 
       
Note that the choice of green colour to represent the centripetal forces 
in each entity is borne by the fact that the combination of the two primary 
colours – yellow and blue – that represent the political entities, results in 
green. As is known, the central government sphere is made up of the 
combination of elements from the two federating units. This finds illustration 
in Figure 3 below. 
Figure 3. Formation of a Federal State – ‘True’ Federalism diagram 
 
 
 
 The three diagrams above illustrate how the presence of two 
opposing forces within each of two separate political entities leads to the 
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formation of a federal state, to design a constitution that permits the 
accommodation and expression of opposing demands. It is clear that the root 
of federalism is about two entities which come together to create an 
additional central government by sacrificing an equal ‘part’, but not all, of 
their original independence to the emerging joint government. Figure 3 
illustrates this perfectly, as the central or general government is shown to be 
formed by the coming together of the two circles representing the political 
entities, without drawing another circle for the new government to make it 
three. This shows that the general government is not a primary government 
entity, but a secondary government that is made up of combined inputs from 
the federating entities in terms of function and personnel. 
 It means that whatever functions, roles and powers are allocated to 
the central government are products of contention, negotiation, and 
compromise between the primary governments – federating units. This 
means that, while the constituent governments face pressures from the 
opposing demands in question, the central government is supposed to have 
one singular mission of unification, without any centrifugal inclination, since 
it is not a basal government. In pursuit of the goal of unification for which it 
was established, the central government often tries to expand its scope, by 
introducing new policies or ignoring the original design of the federal 
constitution, which means the central government gradually encroaches into 
the remaining independent spheres of the federating entities.85 This 
possibility is illustrated in Figure 4 and it deviates from ‘true’ federalism; 
with the attempt to erode, instead of safeguarding, the reserved independence 
of the constituent governments.86  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
85 The Nigerian federation from immediately after the first republic (1963-1966) to date 
offers a clear representation of this situation which most scholars term ‘centralized 
federalism’. There is hardly any significant sphere of function that the constituent 
governments are allowed to differ in order to institutionally secure diversity. Instead, every 
effort is made to unify activities, policies, and even operations, despite the stark differences 
that exist among the people that make up Nigeria which led to the choice of a federal system 
at the onset. 
86 It is not to say that this is bad; if both entities equally give-up their remaining 
independence, integration or unification would have taken place, and federalism may give 
way to Unitarianism. But if one entity still wishes to maintain its independence, then it will 
amount to forced unification. 
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Figure 4. Prominence of centripetal forces – Towards Unification 
 
     However, the pull of centrifugal forces might be so strong that the 
federating entities would be making several agitations to increase their 
independent spheres, which automatically means encroaching into the 
reserved area for centripetal demands. Even though this is not often the case 
compared to the instance mentioned above, when it does happen, the central 
government might be eroded or undermined; neither of which represents 
‘true’ federalism as I argue. This possibility is represented in Figure 5.  
Figure 5. Prominence of centrifugal forces – Towards disintegration 
 
 Meanwhile, in both instances represented in Figures 4 and 5, there 
are usually pressures from the other government(s) within the federation to 
push back whatever demand that is encroaching into the spheres of the other 
valued demand. For instance, in case the central government came up with 
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new policies that the constituent units felt encroached into their 
independence, the centrifugal forces would rise to resist further 
implementation of the centripetal force’s induced policies. This reshapes the 
expanded central government sphere on the federalism diagram to the 
original shape (Figure 3) that reinforces the equilibrium of the two demands.  
 That is to say, encroachments are very possible in a federal 
relationship to underline the fact that two opposing forces are in tension, and 
competing at all times to trump each other, yet are each expected to be 
defended, accommodated, and safeguarded. True federalism is poised to 
actualize this goal by permitting agitations, negotiations, and compromises, 
between empowered distinct political entities within a state.87 It is through 
the expression of these three key features that equilibrium or balance can be 
perceived, as well as the ascertainment of the practice of true federalism in a 
country. Where agitations are ignored, negotiations are not welcome, and the 
expression of one of the opposing demands is suppressed, instead of attempts 
to reach a compromise that will restore balance, it is an indication of a rape 
on true federalism.  
 Unfortunately, the expansion of the central government often signals 
the hegemony of one of the federating units above the other(s), which might 
have gradually taken over the central government using several ploys. The 
dominant group in the central government pursues this expansion under the 
pretence of unification as a centripetal pull, and attempts to eliminate every 
trace of centrifugal allegiance. But in reality, they uphold their own 
centrifugal values and make these become the national values,88 which often 
instigates other suppressed constituent unit(s) to agitate for self-
determination instead. This is because they are forced to sacrifice their 
remaining independence for unification, or even being subsumed, against 
their original intention for the federal bargain. This situation is illustrated in 
Figure 6 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
87 Outside federal systems, regions might be empowered to act on some areas, but that 
comes at the mercy of the superior central government. In federal systems, federalism means 
that both levels of government are superior on their own terms and none can boss the other 
without the possibility of being challenged.   
88 To a large extent, India and Pakistan provide a suitable illustration for this with the choice 
of Hindi as the national language in the former as many people argue, and also the strong 
Punjabi influence in the latter. Also, subsequent Nigerian leaders from the North have 
attempted to suppress other centrifugal inclinations within the federation while promoting 
theirs as the National values – the move to Islamize Nigeria is illustrative. 
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Figure 6.  Expanded centre cum suppression of one political entity 
 
 From the diagram, a few things can be observed. First, it clearly 
shows an enlarged central government sphere. Secondly, the neutral green 
colour the centre had in Figures 3 and 4, to show the equal influences from 
both constituent units represented by yellow and blue, has changed to a 
lighter blue. This indicates a larger insertion of blue elements into the centre 
in relation to its partnering yellow entity. Therefore, while the diagram 
depicts eroded independent jurisdictions of the two federating units, one of 
them—entity or region B—has actually gained more through the central 
government sphere while the other has genuinely lost its independent 
jurisdiction. This is far from a true federalism; shared and independent 
jurisdictions should always be maintained and reinforced, instead of treating 
one aspect with contempt.   
 
Conclusion 
 This article has confronted the question of true federalism which has 
been largely clamoured for across different countries. The boundary between 
federalism and true federalism remains blurred as both are presumably 
committed to the same goal, but the article explains why it has become 
attractive for proponents to stress ‘true’ federalism instead. This is rooted in 
the idea that there are a number of ways federalism can manifest within a 
broad genus of federal political systems, which could make federalism 
irrelevant if it is possible across all political systems; hence, the continuous 
call for true federalism. Employing the schematics of the Venn diagram has 
helped to create a visual and mental picture of what depicts federalism or 
true federalism.  
 With regard to the question of true federalism, of the three ideas 
given by proponents, this article concludes, firstly, that true federalism does 
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not mean a weak central government against stronger constituent 
governments, which represents a confederation. Both the central and 
constituent governments are strong but limited in true federalism, as shown 
in Figure 3. Secondly, adherence to the division of powers between levels of 
government to safeguard the autonomy of constituent governments, as 
emphasized in the classical model of federalism, is important for the practice 
of true federalism, but not to be followed strictly. This is to enable the 
possibility for sharing and distribution of benefits across the polity, such that 
wealth can be redistributed from richer regions to poorer regions. Even 
though this particular goal continues to be the source of conflicts in federal 
relations, it remains a vital feature of true federalism; this means the tension 
it generates is part of the feature of true federalism. 
 In response to the second question – how true federalism can be 
ascertained – this article concludes that each of the three features of true 
federalism identified above has to be surveyed in a systematic way to 
determine their reinforcements in a given federal system. This means 
analysing the law of the constitution and its practice, as well as observing the 
wrangles within the federation. More concretely, this article finds that there 
is tension in each of the features of true federalism which is manifested in 
constitutional provisions and practices to represent centripetal and 
centrifugal demands, and concludes that equilibrium or balance is the key. 
This should be looked for in the empowerment of each level of government 
to freely express the mandate that reinforces their establishment or being. 
That is, there should be a pursuit for unification and the goal of maintaining 
some levels of independence, without the attempt by any level of 
government to suppress each of these expressions.  
 Conclusively, there is an inevitable tension in every ‘true’ federalism 
that makes agitations, resistances, and compromises the key indicators 
towards balancing the pulls and restraints in the federal intercourse, without 
which the practice cannot represent true federalism. Therefore, if: a) there is 
a constitutional division of powers between levels of governments, such that 
constituent governments represent diverse political communities along 
territorial lines, b) in practice each government’s autonomous sphere cannot 
be encroached, regardless of the need to permit for sharing and distribution, 
without prior consent of that government, and c) agitations from each 
government, or territorial community, is not ignored or brutally supressed 
but considered and negotiated, then true federalism is evident in the society 
in question. These conditions can be found present in most federal systems 
across the globe, and even the European Union to a large extent, regardless 
of the model or variety of federalism in practice. In the majority of places 
where the call for reinventing true federalism is most loud, like Nigeria, 
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India, Pakistan, and Russia, the second (b) and third (c) conditions above are 
always the missing features. 
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